

## Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 06996 181730Z

70

ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05

BIB-01 /086 W

----- 101721

R 181635Z DEC 74

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9366

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T USNATO 6996

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: U.S. ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POINT MONITORING PROPOSAL

REF: (A) STATE 275597 (B) USNATO 6755

1. AT DECEMBER 17 MEETING, WG CONTINUED DISCUSSION OF U.S. ANALYSIS OF FIXED POINT MONITORING. UK REP (GEN ABRAHAMS) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR U.S. RESPONSE (REF A) TO UK COMMENTS WHICH HE SAID WERE INTENDED TO CLARIFY TECHNICAL POINTS AND NOT AS CHANGES TO U.S. TEXT. FRG REP (DZIALAS) PRESENTED TECHNICAL COMMENTS TRANSMITTED IN PARA 4 BELOW. ACTING CHAIRMAN (SMITH) SUGGESTED TEXT IN PARA 3 BELOW AS COVERING NOTE FOR TRANSMITTING U.S. PAPER AND FRG NOTE (REF B) TO SPC.

2. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE COVERING NOTE IS SATISFACTORY. UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY, WE WILL APPROVE IT AT NEXT WG MEETING, JANUARY 14.

SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 06996 181730Z

3. BEGIN TEXT OF COVERING NOTE

SUBJECT: OVERT INSPECTION BY STATIC POSTS

THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, IN A REPORT (1) IN MAY 1974, STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF OVERT VERIFICATION IN MBFR AND RENDERED THE FINDING THAT, TO VERIFY FORCE REDUCTIONS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE THE MOST EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION. THE WORKING GROUP RECOGNISED IN THAT REPORT (1) THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN RECIPROCAL INSPECTION.

2. AS A RESULT OF LATER DISCUSSION, IN THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES CARRIED OUT A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF A SYSTEM OF OVERT INSPECTION BY FIXED (STATIC) INSPECTION POSTS. THAT ANALYSIS IS AT ANNEX A FOR EASE OF REFERENCE. A COMMENT ON THE ANALYSIS BY THE GERMAN MEMBER OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, SETTING OUT SOME POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, IS AT ANNEX B.

3. THE WORKING GROUP AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE US ANALYSIS, AND PARTICULARLY WITH THE VIEW TAKEN OF THE LIMITED MILITARY USEFULNESS OF A STATIC GROUND INSPECTION SYSTEM. THIS CONCLUSION IS MAINLY BASED ON THE FACT THAT SUCH A SYSTEM CANNOT PROVIDE

- OBSERVATION OF INDIGENOUS GROUND FORCES, FOR INSTANCE AGREED FORCE LEVELS, AFTER A FREEZE

- RAPID IDENTIFICATION OF ABNORMAL ACTIVITY IN THE NGA WHICH MIGHT INCREASE WARNING TIME.

- THE STORAGE OF EQUIPMENT

- INCREASED KNOWLEDGE OF WP FORCES IN THE NGA.

AND IS MOREOVER BOTH EASY TO CIRCUMVENT AND MANPOWER INTENSIVE WHEN A COMPARISON IS MADE OF RESULT AGAINST EFFORT. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD HOWEVER BE CAPABLE OF VERIFYING AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO DETECT AN INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF USSR PERSONNEL INTO THE REDUCTION AREA THROUGH GROUND ACCESS POINTS. THE SYSTEM WOULD ALSO, AS SUGGESTED IN THE SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 06996 181730Z

US PAPER:

- MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO EXECUTE A MAJOR QUICK BUILD-UP FROM THE USSR UNLESS THE SOVIETS OPTED FOR AN OUTRIGHT ABROGATION OF THE MBFR AGREEMENT.

- PROVIDE A LIMITED DETERRENCE AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF USSR FORCES INTO THE NGA BY OTHER THAN AGREED ENTRY POINTS BECAUSE THIS WOULD INVOLVE A VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

- PROVIDE FOR THE FACT THAT NATIONAL/OTHER MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD NEED ONLY TO DETECT ANY MILITARY MOVEMENT THROUGH OTHER CROSSING POINTS FOR A VIOLATION TO BE SUSPECTED.

4. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL BY AIR OR SEA COULD ONLY BE MONITORED AT NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS. EFFECTIVENESS WOULD DEPEND ON THE SOVIETS USING ONLY THESE NOMINATED AIRFIELDS AND PORTS FOR AIRLIFT OR SEA TRANSPORT OF TROOPS. MAJOR AIR/SEA MOVEMENTS INTO OTHER AIRFIELDS OR PORTS MIGHT BE DETECTED BY OTHER MEANS, IN DUE COURSE OF TIME, BUT THEIR SCALE AND PURPOSE WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY AND CHALLENGE.

END TEXT.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF FRG TECHNICAL COMMENTS.

(PARAGRAPH REFERENCES ARE KEYED TO U.S. PAPER)

PARA 16. WE BELIEVE THERE ARE 17 RAILWAY CROSSING POINTS FROM THE USSR, 10 INTO POLAND AND 7 INTO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 15 OF THESE ARE FITTED WITH TRANSLOADING FACILITIES 5 ARE USED ON A REGULAR BASIS AND 2 ARE USED ON AN OCCASIONAL BASIS FOR MILITARY TRAFFIC.

PARA 17. 9 CROSSING POINTS HAVE TRACKS WHERE EUROPEAN STANDARD GAUGE AND SOVIET BROAD GAUGE RUN PARALLEL AND TRANSLOADING FACILITIES ARE AVAILABLE. 8 SOVIET BROAD GAUGE TRACKS RUN IN WESTERN DIRECTION. THE TOTAL DISTANCE WHERE THESE TWO GAUGES RUN PARALLEL IS UP TO 50 KILOMETERS. IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA THERE IS ONE FACILITY WITH HANDLING EQUIPMENT TO TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, BULK, CARGO, ETC., BUT NO FACILITIES FOR CHANGING  
SECRET

PAGE 04 NATO 06996 181730Z

WHEEL ASSEMBLIES, WHICH EXIST IN THE USSR.

END TEXT.BRUCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 11 JUN 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 18 DEC 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974ATO06996  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19741275/abbryzcq.tel  
**Line Count:** 144  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 3  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** (A) STATE 275597 (B) USNATO 6755  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 28 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <28 MAR 2002 by shawdg>; APPROVED <28 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: U.S. ANALYSIS OF FRG FIXED POINT MONITORING PROPOSAL  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO BONN  
LONDON  
MBFR VIENNA  
USCINCEUR  
USNMR SHAPE  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005